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NOTES
in England,2 that the insurance money is unpressed with a trust for the
benefit of the purchaser is the proper view.
2. Since the situation in Ohio is not fully settled, legislation should be
adopted to remedy this problem and clarify the rights of the parties.
3. Until such legislation is adopted or until the Ohio Supreme Court
renders a decision in point, Oio attorneys, real estate brokers and insurance
men should be certain their clients are protected during the escrow period.
DON WOLFSON
Management's Prerogatives vs. Labor's Rights
The subject of management's prerogatives as opposed to labor's rights is
a troublesome problem. When employees organize to promote their inter-
ests in an enterprise by the application of their group strength, they do so
for the purpose of obtaining a voice in the determination of policies which,
prior to the inception of collective bargaining were solely within the area
of managements discretion.1
There can be little doubt that a majority of the ranks of management
now hold firmly to the view that some line of demarcation must separate
the areas in which management has sole authority from those in which the
union may be conceded to have the right to bargain.2 Until comparatively
recent times, both labor and management have agreed that certain matters
come under the exclusive control or jurisdiction of one party or the other;
but this picture is starting to cloud at present
OVERLAPPING Aunmory
Labor is gradually expanding its field of action and as a natural conse-
quence there has been increasing labor-management friction on points
which in the past have been considered by management as being exclusively
within its own sphere of authority. There is the prevalent belief that man-
agement must be accorded certain prerogatives as essential to the successful
performance of its role.4 However, it has always been difficult to get labor
and management to agree as to just where the respective lines of authority
2 MATHEwS, LABOR LAw" CAsEs AN MATERIu 76 (Temp. Ed. 1950).
CHAmBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 129(1948); PRESEDENT's NATiONAL LABOR -MANAGEMENT CONFERENcE, SUM-
MARY AND COMMIrTEE REPORTs 56, 57 (Bull. No. 77, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Div.
of Labor Standards 1945).
SMANAGEMEN'S R GHT TO MANAGE 1 (United States Chamber of Commerce
1948).
'MATHEWS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77; HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE
BARGAINING TABLE 56 (1945).
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are to be drawn.5 It is this overlapping of the two fields of claimed au-
thority that causes much labor-management strife when the topic of man-
agement's prerogatives or labor's rights is raised in a labor dispute.
The fact that these overlapping claims of authority exist is known to
most persons who are connected with labor disputes. Furthermore, both
labor and management are anxious to present their views to the interested
bystander and for this purpose maintain research organizations. Their
theories on the surface seem generally to agree with each other; but, in prac-
tice, these views can be interpreted so as to lead to lively arguments at the
bargaining table or before an administrative board.
POINTS AFFECTING RIGHTS OF BoTH PARTES
(a) Right to hire, release or discipline
One of the most important areas of overlapping claims of authority is
the power to hire, release or discipline employees. According to the United
States Department of Labor:
The right to hire, release or discipline for just cause and to mamtai
discipline and efficiency of employees, is the sole prerogative of the com-
pany. In addition, the products to be manufactured, the location of plants,
the schedule of production if in harmony with the provisions incorporated
heretofore under the section of Wages and Hours, the methods, processes
and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility
of the company.'
The right to hire, release or discipline for just cause and to maintain
discipline and efficiency of employees immediately raises the question of
who is to be the judge of a "just cause," what is to be considered "efficient,"
and how these issues are to be decided. Not too long ago, the above ques-
tions would not have been raised since it would have been understood that
management would decide the issues. It was presumed that managements
rights in this respect came about by virtue of "(1) its ownership of the
premises; and (2) its relationship as an employer, rather than as a party to
collective bargaining agreements."7 Strictly speaking, therefore, any con-
cession made was voluntary on managements part since it was part of its
pre-existing rights; today, however, labor is partaking to a far greater de-
gree in the deciding of such issues. For example, labor unions in connec-
tion with the right to hire have taken the stand that such autocratic power
in the hands of management deprives the worker of the right of contract s
'MAaHEws, op. ct. supra note 1, at 80; CHAM L.AIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at
130.
' COLLECTIVE BARGAiNING PROVISIONS - MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES 5 (U.S.
Government preliminary draft November, 1948).
THILL AND HOOK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 116.
8 RSOLVED THAT LABOR SHOULD BE GrVEN A DiacT SHARE IN THE MANAGE-
MENT OF INDUSTRY (American Federation of Labor Memorandum 1946).
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With labor's more aggressive stand on these matters, there are certain to
be more claims of overlapping authority on a greater number of issues.
(b) Personaditws
Aside from the purely factual disagreements, there are problems arising
out of differences in the personalities of parties to a labor dispute. One
person might take a completely different stand on a question than another,
regardless of whether he is on the same side of the economic fence or not.
Not all managements assert the same prerogatives, and not all labor unions
are equally aggressive. Consequently, a perfect solution or settlement for
one group of labor representatives might be no solution for another group
and might even cause untold damages regarding future negotiations. Dif-
ferent people often interpret the same printed material in different ways.
For example, two different managements may give opposite interpretations
of a contract paragraph which lists the functions belonging to management
and those belonging to labor. One management will claim that all the
functions not specifically mentioned as belonging to labor belong to man-
agement, whereas another management will admit that these functions are
subject to collective bargaining9
(c) Industry-wzde bargzmrng
A possible step toward a solution for such problems is industry-wide
bargaining. However, even if this would eliminate some of the diffi-
culties arising from personalities, management would run into greater
dangers. Labor favors industry-wide bargaining, but certain management
groups favor a regional basis as against a national basis.10 These manage-
ment groups believe that a contract good for the whole industry could well
be disastrous for an individual firm, and that, consequently, bargaining
should be kept at a local level This would, they claim, also protect the
local management's rights in that it could make its own contract with the
local union and not be forced to agree to a plan adopted m some distant
plant or area. They argue that if industry-wide bargaining were established
a plant in a completely different labor market area from the local employer
might set the local employer's practice concerning wages or fringe benefits.
In many cases, the local employer might not be able to meet the pace set in
collective bargaining negotiations between leading companies in the in-
dustry and a powerful labor union.
(d) Joint committees
One of the clauses which labor often seeks to incorporate in employ-
9 HILL AND HOOK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 117.
"' New Issues it Colleawe Bargaining, address by Frank Rising before the Evening
Session of the 52d Annual Congress of American Industry, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,
New York City, Thursday, December 4, 1947.
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ment contracts is a provision for labor-management committees, sometimes
known as joint committees. From labor's point of view this is something
generally to be desired since the formation of such committees would give
labor representatives some voice in the actual running of the company
concerned." A common example of a joint committee in existence today
is a production committee. Such committees are made possible only be-
cause management has given ground on one of its oldest rights, namely, the
right to control production.' 2
(e) Arbtration
Regardless of the fact that management does not ordinarily desire arbi-
tration, it is becoming more and more a part of the contract picture. Under
this class of contracts there is, however, the danger that if the arbitration
clause is too indefinite or gives the arbitrator too much ground either party
might find itself losing some of its supposedly fixed rights.' 3 As a conse-
quence, the arbitrator's scope and power as to matters brought before him
is often the subject of dispute between labor and management. Here,
again, management is giving up some of its rights to a third party because
it has given the third party arbitrator the potential power to infringe upon
its remaining rights. Of course, labor may lose its newly attained rights by
the same procedure. Since some management groups are against unlimited
arbitration as proposed by unions, they have set up certain defenses in-
cluding a general management clause, specific limitation of the referee's
jurisdiction, a clearly defined grievance procedure and clarified management
discretion for use in arbitration proceedings.1
4
HISTORY OF RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES
(a) Labor's herttage
Labor has not always had the right to bargain collectively for its wages
and to better working standards. In the early years of recognized guilds-
rnen and masters in Europe, it was an offense, indictable under the doctrine
of conspiracy, for laborers to combine for the purpose of raising wages or
bettering working standards.' 5
In 1786 the American worker took one of the first steps down the long
road leading to the recognition of his rights, In that year, in Philadelphia,
some printers struck for a six dollar a week wage.'6
1 SHOULD LABOR HAVE A DIRECT SHARE IN MANAGEMENT 4, 30, 31 (C.I.O.
Dept. of Education and Research 1947)
' HILL AND HOOK, op. co:. supra note 4, at 114.
'VoLUNTARY ARBITRATION O LABOR DIsPUTEs 3 (American Federation of
Labor 1947)
" HLL AND HOOK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 111.
'MERGERs AND THE LAW 11 (National Industrial Conference Board 1929).
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Until the landmark case of Commonwealth v. Hunt 7 was decided in
1842, however, American labor combinations were considered conspiracies.
In this case, the American law departed from the theory that employee ac-
rioa became an unlawful conspiracy as soon as it took the form of joint
action or combination. Without legalizing strikes, picketing or many
other related union activities, the court refused to classify combined action
by a labor union as criminal sunply because it was combined action. Crimi-
nality of concerted action thereafter depended upon the nature and purpose
of the action."' Although since that time American labor has obtained
recognition as an independent bargaining force, as the result of numerous
court decisions and the passage of legislation, there have been many set-
backs for labor.
(b) Management prerogathves and labor rsghts under the law
As the labor movement progressed in the United States, the manage-
ment factions, in an attempt to retain as long as possible their "prerogatives,"
continuously applied every legal maneuver which they could discover to
block labor's expanding power. The management maneuvers were highly
successful in the late 1800's and the early 1900's. However, as the twentieth
century grew older, labor's bargaining position was strengthened by
judicial decisions and legislation. Generally speaking, management was
able, until the 1930's, to protect its position and prerogatives better than
labor was able to gain recognition of its wanted rights.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which placed sanctions on con-
tracts, agreements or combinations which tended to restrain interstate trade
or commerce,19 when applied by the courts in actions against labor unions
hbad an adverse effect on the rights of labor.
The courts first applied the Sherman Act to labor unions in United
States v. Worktngmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans.20  In that
case an injunction was granted restraining a labor union from striking on
the ground that the strike was an unlawful restraint of interstate commerce.
The court declared that the union members by their strike had become a
combination in restraint of interstate commerce within the meaning of the
statute.
The United States Supreme Court in Loew v. Lawler2l held that under
the Act secondary boycotts affecting interstate commerce were illegal.
10 MiLLiS, How COLLECIVE BARGAINING WoRKs 871 (Twentieth Century Fund
1942).
"14 Metcalf 111 (Mass. 1842).
"For a detailed discussion of the case in the economic and social setting, see Nelles,
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COL. L. REV. 1128 (1932).
2226 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1946).
54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D.La. 1893).
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More important, however, was the Court's declaration that the labor union
officers and members were jointly liable in statutory damages 22 to the plain-
tiff for injuries caused by their unlawful restraint of interstate commerce.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawler was most dis-
concerting to organized labor. This decision placed both umon funds and
the individual savings of the members in jeopardy. As a result, labor put
on a drive for new legislation which resulted in the passage of the Clayton
Act of 1914.28
The Clayton Act was intended to protect labor unions from injunctions
halting strikes, peaceful picketing, payment of strike benefits by the union
to its members and peaceful boycotts. Another important provision of
the statute intended to be beneficial to labor was the section which de-
clared that the antitrust laws could not be used to prevent labor from
achieving legitimate objectives.24
Labor's enthusiasm over the Clayton Act was short-lived for the am-
biguous language of the Act still permitted management forces to attack
labor through the courts. 25 In Duplex Prmuntng Co. v. Deermg, the Su-
preme Court repudiated the idea that the Act was intended to legalize the
secondary boycott; and, further, the Court declared that a labor organization
could become an illegal combination in restraint of trade if it departed from
lawful objectives.26 The Court also held that the employer's business is a
property right and under Section 20 of the Act could be protected by an in-
junction granted to the employer.
By allowing management to bring a private suit in equity to restrain a
violation of the antitrust laws, the Clayton Act gave to management an
additional legal weapon against labor.27  Under the Sherman Act there
were only three enforcement methods: (1) criminal proceedings brought
by the Government; (2) damage suits brought by private parties; and
(3) injunction proceedings brought by the Government.28 The Clayton
Act added a fourth method which was a private suit in equity to restrain a
violation of the Sherman Act. Although later cases were more sympathetic
n208 U.S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 35 Sup.
Ct. 170 (1915).
'Law1or v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915).
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1952); 38 STAT.
737 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §§ 381 et. seq. (1946); 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1946).
'4P-H LABOR COURSE 1042 (1949).
2 PURDY, LINDAHL, CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
316 (1942).
" 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
2P-H LABOR COURSE 1044 (1949).
"BERmAN, LABOR AND THE SHERmAN ACt 102-103 (Harper'1930).
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to labor,29 it can be safely said that the Clayton Act did not materially affect
any of managemenes traditional powers.
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 gave to railroad workers engaged in
interstate commerce some of the claimed basic rights of labor. This statute
and its subsequent amendments were the culmination of legislative attempts
to regulate labor-management practices in the railroad transportation in-
dustry.3°
Under the terms of the Act, railway workers were expressly given the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing. The statute established a system of compulsory arbitration
wherein management was required to meet with labor to discuss the settle-
ment of disputes. It also outlawed "yellow dog" contracts by declaring
specifically that "no carrier, its officers, or agents shall require any person
seeking employment to sign any contract or agreement to join or not join
a labor organization."3' Under the terms of the statute any failure by the
employer to comply with the act amounted to a misdemeanor.3 2 Labor's
power was significantly increased by the passage of the Railway Labor Act.
It should be noted also that many of the provisions of this bill were in-
corporated in subsequent labor legislation.
The Federal Ant-Injunction Norris-LaGuardia Act 3  was designed to
curb drastically the use of the injunction as an anti-strike weapon. Almost
from the beginning of the rise of organized labor, late in the nineteenth
century, federal courts have used injunctions to frustrate unions in their
efforts to win concessions from employers. As noted before, the Sherman
Antitrust Act was interpreted to apply to labor organizations and to per-
mit federal courts to enjoin strikes as illegal combinations in restraint of
trade. The Clayton Act was designed to wipe out the anti-labor court de-
cisions under the Sherman Act. However, it fell short of its purpose. It
left federal courts with the power to issue injunctions against labor unions
when irreparable injury was threatened and the employer had no other
'United States v. Hutchison, 312 U.S. 219, 61 Sup. Ct 463 (1941); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940).
' 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1946). The Rail-
way Labor Act of 1926 was preceded by other attempts to regulate labor practices in
the railroad industry. The Erdman Act, passed in 1898, was intended to establish
the legal right of railroad employees to organize. 'Yellow dog" contracts were
prohibited, but this particular section of the Act was declared unconstitutional.
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908). The Supreme Court
declared that personal liberty as well as the right of property was invaded without
due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
' 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1946).
'44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1946).
"47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1946).
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available remedy.34 Labor organizations continued to campaign for an
effective ant-injunction statute and, in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was passed.
The Federal Anti-Injunction Act is noteworthy in that Congress ex-
plicitly defined in it the public policy of the United States in regard to labor
controversies and the employer-employee relationship. In declaring the
public policy of the United States in reference to labor controversies, the
Act provided: (1) that the individual unorganized worker have full free-
dom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of
his own choosing; (2) that he have the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions of employment; and (3) that he should be free from interfer-
ence, restraint or coercion by employers or their agents in the designation
of representatives and in self-organization or other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual protection.35
The Act prohibits federal courts from issuing an injunction in a labor
dispute under most circumstances. Unless an employer is threatened with
irreparable injury to his property as a result of the union's unlawful acts and
has exhausted all reasonable efforts to settle the dispute, he cannot obtain
an injunction."
The passage of this act produced a great change in the rights of the
labor and management factions. Section 4 of the Act dearly denied man-
agement the use of the federal courts to enforce by injunction any "yellow
dog" contract. In general, it can be said that Section 4 of the Act pre-
vented management from enjoining peaceful picketing; however, picketing
was still enjoinable if accompanied by fraud or violence.37
For a long time courts had been inclined to hold that the primary boycott
was lawful. There were, however, powerful judicial precedents against
the secondary boycott until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.38
After the passage of that Act, the courts held that a secondary boycott was
legal unless accompanied by fraud or violence.39  Although the term
"boycotting" was not specifically mentioned in the Act, Section 4(i) dealt
with the problem in general. That Section denied the use of an injunction
by the federal courts in the case of " advising, urging or otherwise
34Duplex Priting Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
'47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1946)
-47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1946). Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign
Writers' Local Union No. 591, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1934)
"rMilk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312
U.S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552 (1941)
'Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 Sup.
Ct. 522 (1929); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct.
172 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
'Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939).
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causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore speci-
fied. "
The courts have held that a labor union could not be enjoined from
striking and picketing to enforce a dosed shop under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act if fraud or violence did not appear. The Act allowed a union to strike
and picket the plant of an employer for the purpose of forcing him into a
dosed shop agreement, as long as the picketing was conducted in a peaceful
manner. This is the rule even though the members of the union are not
the employees of the employer against whom the picketing is directed so
long as a "labor dispute" as defined in the Act exists.40
An important piece of legislation dealing with the rights of the Ameri-
can laborer was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.41 The Act placed
new restrictions on the powers of managment by invading what manage-
ment had previously regarded as matters strictly within the province of the
individual employer. The Act not only enumerated the powers taken from
management, but it also put management in the position of not being able
to sue a labor union for certain acts, such as the breach of its contract, etc.
Therefore, the Act was a double blow to management.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, often called the Wagner
Act, was designated to regulate the activities of employers only. It pro-
vided for representative elections in which employees could designate that
union which they wished to represent them. 2  After a union had been
designated, the employer was required to bargain with it on wages, hours
and working conditions.43 Gone forever from the American labor picture
was managemenes power to decide those matters arbitrarily. In addition,
the Act contained a list of other unfair labor practices,44 thus greatly re-
stricting the powers of management. If an employer were found guilty of
committing one of these unfair labor practices, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had the power to order the issuance of a cease and desist order
against hun and to take remedial action to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
The Fair Labor Standards Act45 has an important bearing upon the
wage, hour and other related provisions which are usually written into a
collective bargaining agreement. This Act gave to persons working on
' P-H LABOR COusH 1 5064 (1949).
0'49 STAT. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1946). This act has been
changed considerably by 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141
et. seq. (Supp. 1952).
61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
4361 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952).
Ibul.
"52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1946).
1953]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
interstate goods the right to a minimum wage as prescribed in the Act."
Also provisions were included on child labor 7 and record-keeping. 8  Of
great importance to the average working man was the clause requiring that
he be paid at the rate of time and a half for all hours worked over the
statutory week of forty hours."
The Fair Labor Standards Act did not, however, cover all employees.
Exempted from the overtime provisions were employees of motor carriers,
railroad and steamship lines, agricultural laborers and processors and
seasonal workers. In addition, executive, administrative and professional
employees; retail employees; outside salesmen; employees of retail or ser-
vice establishments, small newspapers, telephone exchanges and local transit
companies; agricultural laborers and seamen were exempt from both the
overtime and the minimum wage provisions.50
Generally speaking, while former labor legislation dealt primarily with
strikes, boycotts, etc., this Act dealt with the physical aspect of the working
place and the amount of remuneration an individual should receive for his
efforts. Both topics had previously been considered by management as be-
ing within its realm of control.
The most recent major piece of legislation affecting labor and manage-
ment is the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947"'
which amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. This Act gen-
erally favors management but it has some features that are favorable to the
average worker, even though these may not be favorable to the union as
such. The individual worker has acquired the right not to be coerced or re-
strained by any union' 2 from the exercise of his right of organization and
collective bargaining. 3
Several sections of the 1947 Act struck at the power of the labor unions.
The Act modified the union shop provisions of the old National Labor Re-
lations Act. Under the old law, the union shop was permissible whether or
not a majority of the employees wanted it. Under the 1947 amendments
to the old National Labor Relations Act, the union shop was made legal only
if a majority of the employees covered by the contract had voted for it.
The 1951 amendments to the old National Labor Relations Act allow the
"52 STAT. 1062 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1946)
'"52 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1946).
4852 STAT. 1066 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1946).
"52 STAT. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1946).
'52 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1946)
"61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et. seq. (Supp. 1952).
5261 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952)
"61 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
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company and the union by agreement to set up a union shop.5" However,
provision is made for a method by which the employees can end the union
shop by having an election." The dosed shop was made illegal along with
the preferential shop, union hiring hall and referral clauses.5 6 Under the
old law only employers were obliged to bargain. Under the 1947 amend-
ments, unions as well as employers were guilty of an unfair labor practice
if they refused to bargain.5 The amended National Labor Relations Act
permits the National Labor Relations Board to obtain a temporary restrain-
ing order as soon as it issues a complaint. It can obtain a five day restraint
on unlawful boycotts and jurisdictional strikes.58 Formerly, the Board
could act only against employers and its orders were effective only when
enforced by a court. The 1947 Act states that unions cannot engage in un-
lawful boycotts or jurisdictional strikes or persuade employees of other
employers to do so. Employers thus affected may file charges with the
National Labor Relations Board and secure temporary restraining orders 9
Another provision of the 1947 Act specifies that employers and unions
both must give a sixty day nonce before terminating or modifying a con-
tract. Employees who strike within the sixty day period lose their status as
employees.10
CONCLUSION
Both management and labor realize the need for a sound understanding
between each other as to just what constitutes the rights of one as opposed
to the rights of the other. Even though there is desire for agreement, it
does not necessarily follow, however, that an agreement will be reached on
all matters brought up for discussion. It is inevitable that certain points
will touch areas thought by both parties to be under their authority or
control. In such cases there is little more for the parties to do than bar-
gain between themselves on the basis of factual information. This will
undoubtedly cause one or both of the parties to give some ground before a
workable solution can be attained.
RICHARD A. CLuAPP
"65 STAT. 601 (1951), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1952).
n65 STAT. 601 (1951), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1) (Supp. 1952).
"65 STAT. 601 (1951), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. 1952).
u65 STAT. 601 (1951), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (Supp. 1952).
"62 STAT. 991 (1948), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. 1952).
"61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1951); 61 STAT. 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1947).
061 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1951).
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